Isaacs' Equations for Value-Functions of Differential Games by Frankowska, H. & Quincampoix, M.
Isaacs' Equations for Value-
Functions of Differential Games




Frankowska, H. and Quincampoix, M. (1992) Isaacs' Equations for Value-Functions of Differential Games. IIASA Working 
Paper. WP-92-055 Copyright © 1992 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/3643/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
Working Paper 
I 
Isaacs' Equations for 






IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria 
h . d ~  Telephone: +43 2236 715210 Telex: 079 137 iiasa a Telefax: +43 2236 71313 
Isaacs' Equations for 






Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed 
herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
r!l I IASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis o A-2361 Laxenburg Austria 
IMI. Telephone: +43 2236 715210 o Telex: 079 137 iiasa a Telefax: +43 2236 71313 
Isaacs' equations for value-funct ions 
of differential games 
H616ne Frankowska & Marc Quincampoix 
CEREMADE, UNIVERSITC DE PARIS-DAUPHINE 
DCPARTEMENT DE MATH~MATIQUES, U N I V E R S I T ~  DE TOURS 
FOREWORD 
The authors study value functions of a differential game with payoff which 
depends on the state a t  a given end time. They consider differential games 
with feedback strategies and with nonanticipating strategies. They prove 
that value-functions are solutions to some Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations 
in the viscosity and contingent sense. For these two notions of strategies, 
with some regularity assumptions, The authors prove that value-functions 
are the unique solution of Isaacs' equations. 
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Isaacs' equations for value-functions 
of differential games 
HClGne F'rankowska & Marc Quincampoix 
1 Introduction 
Let us consider the following differential game: 
(1) x'(t) = f ( t ,  4 t h  u(t), v(t)), t E [to, TI { i!) u(t)  , u v(t) , v 
The two players act on the state x(.) by choosing controls, u for the first 
player and v for the second one. The goal of the first player is to maximize 
a t  the given end time T the payoff g(x(T)),  the second player wants to 
minimize it. 
Let us recall that the game with the following payoff: 
may be reduced to the above one. In fact, by the simple change of variable 
z := (x, y), we obtain the new game 
(3) { i) (xf( t) ,  yf(t)) = (f ( t ,  ~ ( t ) ,  u(t),  v(t)), L(t,  x(t),  u(t),  v( t)))  i i )  u(t)  E U 
iii) v(t) E V 
with the payoff G(x(T),  y(T)) := g(x(T)) + y (T) which is equal to (2). 
Since Isaacs (cf [14]), it is well-known that the value-function satisfies a 
partial differential equation (the Isaacs' equation) when the game is regular 
enough. The solutions of this equation have been studied by Isaacs himself 
in C1 case (see [14]), lipschitz solutions have been studied for example in 
[15], and in [9], [5], [17] for viscosity solutions. However such regularity is 
not always the case (see also for instance [12], [4], [6] ... for control systems). 
We introduce two notions of strategies and we prove that the associated 
value-functions are solutions to Isaacs' equation without any assumptio~ls 
concerning the regularity of g. In this paper, we mainly state results (see 
[13] for more detailed proofs). 
2 Feedback strategies of differential games 
Consider a function f : [0, TI x Rn x U x V H Rn where U and V are tw.0 
complete separable metric spaces. Let us denote by t H x(t,  to, 20, u( . ) ,  v(.)) 
the solution to (1) corresponding to controls u( . ) ,  v(-) ,  starting from xo at 
time to (i.e. such that x( to )  = xo) .  We shall need the following assumptions: 
( i )  f  is continuous 
i i )  V ( t ,  x )  E [0, T ]  x Rn, V ( u ,  v )  E U x V  the sets 
f ( t , x , u , V ) ,  f ( t , x , U , v )  are compact and convex 
I iii) V ( t , x , u , v )  E [O,T] x Rn x U  x V ,  functions f ( t ,  x ,  ., v )  and f ( t ,  x ,  u ,  -) are 1 - Lipschitz, where 1 > 0  
i v )  V R  > 0,  3 c ~  E L1(O,T) such that for almost all 
t  E [O,T] and for a11 ( u , v )  E U  x V ,  f ( t , . , u , v )  
is cR( t )  - Lipschitz on B(0 ,  R ) .  
I v )  3 k  E L1(O, T )  such that for almost all t  E [0, TI SUP,,u sup,,v ( I f  ( t ,  x,u,v)ll L k ( t ) ( l  + 11xl1> 
We call feedback strategy for the first player any function p  : [0, TI x X H 
U such that ( t , x )  H f ( t ,  x ,  p ( t ,  x ) ,  V )  is upper semicontinuous with respect 
to ( t ,  x ) .  We denote by the set of feedback strategies for the first player. 
In a similar way we can define feedback strategies for the second player and 
Q the set of such strategies. We denote by U (respectively V )  the set of 
measurable functions [0, TI H U (respectively [0, T ]  I-+ V ) .  
We assume furthermore the following crucial condition which allows to 
define the value function of the game: 
There exists a pair of feedback strategies (p*,  +*) E x Q such that for 
any measurable control u( . ) ,  there exists an unique solution to 
such that x( to )  = xo and we denote by x(. ,  to,  xo,  u( .) ,  +*(., -)) this solution. 
In a similar way, we assume also the existence and unicity of x(. ,  to, xo, p*(., -), v ( . ) )  
and x ( - ,  to, 5 0 ,  @(., .), $*(., -)). 
( 5 )  { v (to, xo), v ( u ( . ) ,  v ( . ) )  E U x v g ( x ( T ,  to, xo, u ( . ) ,  $*(., .))) 5 g ( x ( T ,  to, xo, @(., $*(., .))I 
5 g ( x ( T ,  to, xo, P(.,  9, v ( . ) ) )  
Definition 2.1 If (5) is satisfied, we call 
the value function1 of the diferential game with feedback strategy. 
3 Contingent solutions to Isaacs' equations 
Consider the following contingent2 inequalities: 
I O ( T ,  .) = g(.) and V ( t ,  x )  E Dom(O)  i )  if t E [0, T [ ,  then SUP"€ u infv€ V D@(t ,  x ) ( l ,  f ( t ,  x , u ,  2 ) ) )  I 0 i i )  if t E [0, T [ ,  then SUPUEu i n f v ~  V D 1 0 ( t , 5 ) ( 1 ,  f ( t ,  2,  U ,  v ) )  L 0 
O ( T ,  .) = g(.)  and V ( t ,  x )  E Dom(O)  
i )  if t E [0, T [ ,  then 
infve v S U P U E ~  DtO(t ,  5 ) ( 1 , f ( t ,  x , u ,  v ) )  I 0 
i i )  if t E [O,T[, then 
i n f u ~  V SUPuEu D , O ( t , x ) ( l ,  f ( t ,  x , u ,  4) 2 0 
A such O : [0, TI x Rn I+ is called contingent solution to  the Isaacs' 
equation. We can prove without any assumptions on g the following: 
Proposition 3.1 Assume that (4) and (5) hold true, then the value function 
satisfies (6)i) and (7)ii). 
'This definition is very related to the one of Pierre Bernhard (see [7]). 
2Recall the definition of the contingent epiderivative of O : Rn ++ a t  xo E Dorn(O), 
O(xo  + hv)  - @(lo)  D ,  O(xo) (u)  = lim inf 
h-O+,v-u h 
or equivalently E p i D I O ( x o )  = TEpiO(xO,  ( x O ) ) ,  where Epi states for the epigraph. In 
a similar way for the contingent hypoderivative of 8 a t  xo E Dom(O) is defined by 
D , O ( x ) ( u )  := - D l  ( - O ) ( x ) ( u ) ,  and the contingent derivative of O a t  xo E Dom(O) is 
defined by: 
GraphD@(xo) = T ~ r o p h ~ ( x ~ ,  @ ( l o ) ) .  
Proof - Let us prove (6)i). Fix ii E U and h > 0. Define xh a solution of 
x l ( t )  = f ( t ,  x ( t ) ,  ii, +*) t E [to, to + h] such that x ( tO)  = 50 .  Let us introduce 
21 if t E [to, t o  + h] 
Y'*(t, ~ ( t ,  o + h ,  xh(tO + h ) ,  (P*(., .), +*(., .)))) 
if t > t o + h  
Then by the very definition of W ,  
W ( t o  + h ,  ~ h ( t o  + h )  = g ( x ( T ,  to + h ,  to + h ) ,  d*(. ,  .), $*(., .))) which is 
equal to g ( x ( T ,  to, s o ,  ~ h ( - ) ,  $*(., .))) and by ( 5 ) ,  g ( x ( T ,  to, s o ,  ~ h ( - ) ,  $ * ( a 7  .))I 5 
g ( x ( T ,  to, 5 0 ,  @(., 9, $*(., 9)) = W ( t 0 ,  2 0 ) -  Hence 
lim inf W ( t O  + h ,  xh(t0 + h ) )  - W ( t 0 , x o ) )  < h - h-+O+ 
Thanks to our assumptions and by the Mean Value Theorem, there exists 
hn 4 O+ such that: 
This yields infVE D, W ( t o ,  x o ) ( l ,  f ( t ,  x ,  E, v)) 5 0 and proves (6)). 
We can obtain other contingent inequalities with suitable regularity as- 
sumptions concerning strategies 
Proposition 3.2 Assume that (4) and (5) hold true. I f ( t ,  x )  H f ( t ,  x ,  p*(t, x ) ,  V )  
is continuous at ( t o ,  xo ) ,  then the value function W satisfies (6)ii). If ( t ,  x )  H 
j ( t ,  x ,  U,  $*(t, x ) )  is continuous at ( t o ,  so),  then the value function W satisfies 
(7) i). 
Now we shall state an unicity result3: 
Theorem 3.3 Assume that (4)) (5) hold true and that W is continuous. 
If ( t ,  x )  H f ( t ,  x ,  (p*(t, x ) ,  V )  is continuous, then any lower semicon- 
tinuous (1.s.c.) function O satisfying (6)i) is larger or equal than M/ 
3 ~ f  the proof in [13] 
5 
If ( t ,  x )  H f ( t ,  x ,  U,  $*(t, x ) )  is continuou~, then any upper semicontin- 
uous (u.s.c.) function O satisfying (7)ii) is lower or equal than W .  
Corollary 3.4 When (4), (5) hold true, and W is continuous and when 
( t ,  x )  H f ( t ,  x ,  U ,  $*(t,  x ) )  and ( t ,  x )  H f ( t ,  x ,  ( ~ * ( t ,  x ) )  are continuous, the 
value function W is the unique continuous solution to Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs 
inequalities (6) and (7). 
4 Viscosity solutions to Isaacs' equation 
We first define the lower and upper Hamiltonians of the differential (1): 
H- ( t ,  x ,  p) := m a x v ~  v minu€ u < p, f ( t ,  x ,  21, v )  > 
H+(t ,  x ,  p) := minu€ u m a x , ~  v < P ,  f ( t ,  X ,  21, v )  >, 
Consider two Hamilton-Jacobi equations: 
In this section, we give some results concerning viscosity solutions to 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations. First, we recall the definition of viscosity 
solution by using sub and super differentials4: 
Definition 4.1 Consider H : [O,T] x Rn x Rn H R Let us recall that the 
function O : [ o , T ]  x Rn H E is a viscosity supersolution to the following 
Hamilton-Jacobi equation - z ( t ,  x )  + H ( t ,  x ,  - g ( t ,  2 ) )  = 0 if and on/y  if: 
V ( t , ~ )  E Dom(O) ,  V (pt,  P,) E 8 - O ( t , z ) ,  -pt + H ( t , x ,  -p,) > - O 
The function O is a viscosity subsolution if and only i f :  
V ( t , x )  E Dam(@), V ( p t , ~ , )  E d+O( t , x ) ,  -pt + H ( t , x ,  -p,) 5 0 
A function O is a viscosity solution if it is a supersolution and a subsolution. 
4 ~ e c a l l  the definition of the subdifferential of 4 : Rn -a, a t  zo E Dorn(d) 
a-Q(zo) := { p E Rn 1 lim inf,,,, '(z)-'(zo)-<p'z-zo' I l ~ - ~ o  1 2 0 } and the super differential 
of Q at ro is given by: 8+d(ro) := - 8 7  
We can prove without any assumptions concerning g the following exis- 
tence result: 
Proposition 4.2 Assume that (4) holds true, then the value-function W is 
a supersolution to (8) and a subsolution to (9). 
But when the value-function W is continuous, we have the more precise 
Proposition 4.3 Assume (4). Then if W is continuous and ( t ,  x )  t-t f ( t ,  x ,  U,  $*(t,  x)) 
is continuous, then W is a viscosity solution to (8). 
If W is continuous and ( t ,  x )  t-t f ( t ,  x ,  (p*(t, x ) ,  V )  is continuovs, then W is 
a viscosity solution to (9). 
Theorem 4.4 Let assumptions of Corollary 3.4 hold true. Let O : [O,T] x 
Rn t-t R be continuous. Then O is the value function of the game if and 
only if it is a viscosity supersolution to (8) and a viscosity subsolution to (9). 
Corollary 4.5 Let us assume (d), (5) and let O : [O,T] x Rn t-t R be a 
continuovs function. If we assume the following Isaacs' condition: 
then the value function is the unique viscosity solution to (9) (or equivalently(8)). 
These results follow from results of the previous section and from the 
following section. 
5 Comparison between viscosity and contin- 
gent solutions to Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs 
equations 
Proposition 5.1 Consider O : [O,T] x Rn t-t verifying (6) (respectively 
(7)). Then O is a viscosity solution to (8) (respectively to (9)). 
This result is a consequence of the following 
Lemma 5.2 Consider O : [0,  TI x Rn t-t R. 
If O satisfies (6)i), then it is a supersolution of (8). 
If O satisfies (6)ii), then it is a subsolution of (8). 
If O satisfies (7)i), then it is a supersolution of (9). 
If O satisfies (7)ii), then it is a subsolution of (9). 
Proof - Let us prove the first statement. If O satisfying (6)i) then5: 
Then by taking the Usupinf7 of this inequality, we prove that O is a super- 
solution to  (8). The proofs of the other statements are similar. 
When value functions are continuous, the notions of contingent and vis- 
cosity solutions of Isaacs7 equations are equivalent. 
Theorem 5.3 Let O : (0, T ]  x Rn H R be a continuous function and l e t  (4) 
hold true. Then O satisfies the contingent inequalities (6) (respectively (7)) 
if and only if it is a viscosity solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation 
(8) (respectively (9)). 
Lemma 5.4 If (4) holds true. 
Any 1.s.c. function O is a supersolution of (8) if and only if it satisfies 
(6) i)  - 
Any 1.s.c. function O is a supersolution of (9) if and only if it satisfies 
(7) 2) 
Any U.S.C. function O is a subsolution of (8) if and only if it satisfies 
(6)ii). 
5Let us recall (see [2] chapter 6 for instance) that we have the following equivalent 
definition for the subdifferential of a function 4 
a-d(zo)  = { P 1 V q E Rn, D,d(zo)(q) ?< P ,  '2 > 
Any u.s.c. function O  is a  subsolution of (9) if and only if it satisfies 
(7) ii) . 
Proof of Lemma - We already know, thanks to  Proposition 5.1 and 
Lemma 5.2, that contingent solutions are viscosity solutions. Let us prove 
the converse implication. 
Assume that O  is a supersolution to (8), i.e.: 
Hence, for any u  E U ,  in fvEvpt+ < p,, f ( t , x , u , v )  >I 0. But we know, (cf 
[12]) that (pt ,  p,) E d-O(t ,  x )  if and only if (pt , p,, -1) belongs t o  the normal 
cone (TEpiO( t ,  x ,  O ( t ,  5) ) ) - .  We claim that 
Assume for a moment that is false, then, by the separation theorem we should 
have : 
3 ( P ~ , P Z , ~ )  E ( T E p i O ( t , ~ , O ( t , x ) ) ) - ,  3 E U S U C ~  that  
v  E V ,  pt+ < p z , f ( t , x , u , v )  >> 0 
This is a contradiction with (12).  So 
V ( t , x ,  y )  E Epi (O) ,  for all u  E U 
{ 1 1 x f ( t , ~ ,  U  V )  x { 0 ) n c o ( T ~ p i ~ ( t ,  599))  # 0 
and we can deduce from6 Theorem 3.2.4 in [:I], that { 1  ) x f ( t ,  x ,  u ,  V )  x 
{ 0 )  n TEPjo( t ,  x ,  O ( t ,  x ) )  # 0 ,  for any ( t ,  x )  E DomO. This implies the 
following contingent equation: 
V ( 2 ,  x )  E D o m ( O ) ,  V u  E U, inf Dl O ( t ,  x ) ( l ,  f ( t ,  x ,  u ,  v ) )  5 0  
vE V 
6Let us recall 
Theorem 3.2.4 in 
with compact con 
a duality result in viability theory (due to Ushakov see for instance 
[I]). Consider a closed set K C Rn and let F  be u.s.c set-valued map 
vex values. Then the following two statements are equivalent: 
i )  V z  E K ,  F ( z ) n T ~ ( z )  # 0 
i i )  V  z  E K ,  F ( z )  n co(T'(z)) # 0 
where co is the closed convex hull. 
Let us prove the third statement. Assume that O satisfies 
(15) V ( P ~ , P , )  E g+@(t, x ) ,  sup inf pt+ < p,, f ( t ,  x ,  U ,  V )  >> o 
U E U V E V  
We claim that 
If (16) is not satisfied, by the separation Theorem 
V u E U, 3 v E V such that 
( I 7 )  3 ( p t 7 p x 7  9 )  E ( T ~ y ~ ~ @ ( t ,  2 ,  @(t7  x ) ) ) - ,  
pt+ < pz ,  f ( t ,  x ,  u ,  v )  > < 0 
This is a contradiction with (15). Then, thanks to (4) ,  and since (cf [2 ]  
~.130)7 
lim inf co(T~,,,o (t ' ,  x', y')) C T H , ~ ~ O ( ~ ,  x@(t  2 ) )  (t',x',v')-(t,.,@(t,r)) 
we can deduce that { 1 )  x f ( t , x , u ,  V )  x ( 0 )  c T H y p o O ( t , ~ , @ ( t , ~ ) )  and con- 
sequently (7)ii) holds true. The proofs are similar for the other statements. 
0 
6 Nonanticipat ing strategies 
We shall define value-functions for a concept of strategy studied by Elliot- 
Kalton (see also [9]) .  We denote by U ( t )  (respectively by V ( t )  ) the set of 
measurable functions u : [ t ,  T ]  tt U (respectively v : [ t ,  TI tt V ). 
Firstly let us recall the definition of nonanticipating strategies. 
Definition 6.1 We call nonanticipating strategy for the first player any 
function cr : V ( t )  H U ( t )  such that 
and we denote b y  r ( t )  the set of such nonanticipating strategies. 
W e  call nonanticipating strategy for the sevond player any function P 
U ( t )  H V ( t )  such that 
V t  E [O,T], V ( u , i )  E U ( t ) ,  V S  E [O,T], 
u s a. e. in [ t  s + P(u)  G P(u) a. e. in [ t ,  s] 
and we denote by A ( t )  the set of such nonanticipating strategies. 
This notion of strategies enables us to define the two value-functions: 
Definition 6.2 Consider the upper value-function of the game: 
@(to, xo) := inf sup g ( x ( T ,  to, xo, u ( . ) ,  P ( u ) ) )  
P E  A(t0)  u( . )€U( to)  
and the lower value-function: 
Q(to,xo) := sup inf 9 ( x ( T ,  to, xo, o ( v ) ,  v ( . ) ) )  
a€ r ( t O )  ''(.I€ V ( ~ O )  
Proposi t ion 6.3 Assume that (4) holds true. If g is continuous, then 8 
and @ are continuous. 
Proof  - We shall prove that Q is continuous7 at  some t l , x l .  Consider 
E > 0,  , x2 and 0 5 t l  5 t2  5 T .  By the very definition of the value-function 
8 ,  there exists cr E I ' ( t l )  such that 
Fix C E V. For any v ( . )  E V ( t 2 ) ,  we define ~ ( s )  = 
and for any a we define ~ ( v )  = a(2). 
Hence, there exists v ( . )  E V ( t 2 )  such that Q(t2, 2 2 )  > g ( x ( T ,  t2,x2, ~ ( v ) ,  2 ) ) ) ) -  
E and according to (18) ,  we have 8 ( t l ,  x i )  5 g ( x ( T ,  t l ,  X I ,  o ( v ) ,  v ) )  + E.  On 
the other hand, from Gronwall's Lemma, there exists some R > 0 such that 
Ilx(T, t i ,  X I , C ( ~ ) ( . ) ,  v ( . ) ) - x ( T ,  t2, ~ 2 ,  ~ ( v ) ( - ) , v ( - ) ) I l  IR(IIxi - ~ z l l + ( t i  - t 2 ) )  
7 ~ t ' s  easy to extend the proof when g is uniformely continuous and then the value- 
functions are uniformely continuous too. 
Since g  is continuous, there exists 6 > 0 such that for any ( t 2 ,  x2 )  E R([O, 11 x 
B) we have 
Hence Q ( t l , x l )  - Q(t2 ,x2)  I 3 ~ .  On the other hand for every a: Q ( t l , x l )  2 
inf~( . )E~( to)  g (x (T ,  t l ,  x l ,  a ( v ) ,  v ( - ) ) )  2 infv( . )~v( t~)  g(x(T,t2,52, a ( v ) ,  v ( . ) ) ) - &  
Hence Q(t1, x l )  2 Q(t2, x2 )  - e. We have similar result when t2  < t l  and for 
the value-function 9. 
7 Solutions to Isaacs equations with nonan- 
ticipat ing strategies 
Proposition 7.1 If (4) holds true, then 9 satisfies (6)i) and Q  satisfies 
(7) ii) . 
Proof - Fix ii E U. Consider Ph E A( to )  such that 
Let define Uh(to) the subset of measurable controls u(.)  E U( to )  such that 
u ( s )  = ii for almost every s  E [to, to + h]. then 
( I 9 )  SUP g (x (T )  to, "0 ,  u(.) ,  Ph(u))) I @(to, 5 0 )  + h2 
u€Uh(to) 
By the very definition of Ph, there exists some v(.)  E V ( t o )  such that for any 
u ( - )  E Uh, V ( S )  = Ph(u)(s)  for almost every s  E [to, to + h] .  
Let xh ( - )  denote the solution to  x l ( t )  = f ( t ,  x ( t ) ,  ii, v ( t ) )  on [to, to  + h] 
such that xh(to) = xo. From (19), we deduce 
Define P E A( t o )  such that for any u( . )  E U( to )  we have P(u) := Ph(g) with 
ii if s  E [to, to + h] g ( s )  := 
u ( s )  if s  > to + h 
Hence SUPuEu(,,) s(x(T, to,zo, u(.), b(u)))  5 @(to, xo)+h2 and therefore infpca(t0) sup,Eu(to) g(x( 
@(to, xo) + h2. This proves the following inequality 
On the other hand, there exists a sequence h; + 0 and G E V such that  
this yields Df@(to ,  xo) ( l ,  f (to, $0, u, G)) 5 0 and consequently (6)i). The  
proof is similar for the second statement. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  7.2 If g is continuous, then @ satisfies (6)ii) and Q satisfies 
(7) ii) . 
It is possible t o  prove that  @ is a viscosity subsolution to  (8) and thanks to  
results of section 5 that  it is a contingent solution t o  (6)ii) (see [13] for the 
proof). 
Coro l l a ry  7.3 If g is continuous, then @ is a viscosity solution to (8) and 
Q is a viscosity solution to (9). 
Finally we just state an existence result 
P r o p o s i t i o n  7.4 Assume that (4) holds true and that g is uniformely con- 
tinuous. If we assume the Isaacs' condition ( lo) ,  then @ = Q and the value- 
function is the unique uniformely continuous viscosity solution to the Isaacs' 
equation. 
The proof is based on a theorem of Crandall-Lions concerning the unicity of 
bounded uniformely continuous solution of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (see 
[I61 1. 
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